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CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO
OFFICIAL ENGLISH LEGISLATION
"[V]erbal cacophony is . . . not a sign of weakness but of
strength."' The United States Constitution does not stipulate that
English is the official language of the United States.2 In fact, the
Constitution itself was originally published in several languages
including English, German and French.' As a country founded by
immigrants for immigrants, 4 there has been a general intolerance
for mono-linguistic ratification.5 Recently, however, there has
I Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
2 See 9 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789 1088 (Worthington
Chauncey Ford ed., 1907) (stating non-designation of one "official" language in Colonial
America was no oversight by Framers of Constitution as it recognized presence of various
European ethnic groups and existing Native American languages); see also Harris v. Rivera
Cruz, 710 F. Supp. 29, 31 (D.P.R. 1989) (stating that there is no official language in United
States "and if prudence and wisdom... prevail there never shall be. . ."). But see SoberalPerez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36, 42 (2d Cir. 1983) (mentioning that English is national language of United States); Dalomba v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 337 N.E.2d
687, 689 (Mass. 1975) (asserting that official language in United States is English); Alfonso
v. Board of Review, Dep't of Labor and Indus., 444 A.2d 1075, 1077 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1982)
(claiming that English is "official language of this country and of this Commonwealth"). See
generally Juan F. Perea, Official English Laws Demography and Distrust:An Essay on
American Languages, Cultural Pluralismand Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269, 27181 (1992) (noting that there is no official language in United States).
3 See 1 HEINz K.Loss, DAS VOLKSGRUPPENRECHT IN DEN VEREINIGTEN STAATEN VON

AMERICA 78 (1940) (reprinting Continental Congress entries reflecting English, German,
and French editions of Articles of Confederation); JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 1035 (noting Extracts from Votes and Proceedings issued by 1774
Continental Congress ordered published in English and German); see also Yniguez v.
Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 928 n.10 (citation omitted) (stating that "early
political leaders recognized the close connection between language and religious/cultural
freedoms, and they preferred to refrain from proposing legislation which might be construed as a restriction on these freedoms"); NANcY F. CONKLIN & MARGARET A. LOURIE, A
HOST OF TONGUES: LANGUAGE COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 3-6 (1983) (specifying
linguistic demographics of Colonial America); Perea, supra note 2, at 271-81 (noting existence of official Articles of Confederation by Continental Congress in German).
4 See N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1944, at 38 (noting statement by President Franklin D.
Roosevelt where it was recognized that Americans are immigrants or descendants of immigrants); see also 22 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 338-40 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1914) (demonstrating that committee named by John Hancock proposed Great Seal on August 20, 1776 for newly formed United States reflecting Framers' recognition of emerging
American cultural pluralism); HORACE M. KALLEN, CULTURAL PLURALISM AND THE AMERICAN IDEA PAGE (1956) (noting that proposed seal was to be engraved symbolizing different
origins of Americans); HEINZ KLOss, THE AMERICAN BILINGUAL TRADITION 11-12 (1977)
(stating that, in addition to English, German, French and Spanish were principal European languages spoken in what is now continental United States, German being predominant of three).
5 See Rachel F. Moran, Book Review, Irritationand Intrigue: The IntricaciesofLanguage
Rights and Language Policy, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 790, 805 (1991) (reviewing BILL PIATr,
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been a growing trend to pass legislation on both the state and federal levels, declaring English the official governmental language.
On the federal level, proposals to make English the official language generally have been unsuccessful. 6 On the state level, however, many states have passed official-English legislation into
law.7 Language restrictions and discriminatory prototype legislation aimed at non-English speaking Americans are the unfortunate repercussions of an intolerant majority of the population.8
The imposition of English as the official language of the United
States has invoked much debate in both the political and judicial
arenas.9 While political figures fight to pass official-English legislation, courts are in the midst of deciding whether this legislation

ONLY ENGLISH: LAW AND LANGUAGE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1990)) [hereinafter Irri-

tation and Intrigue] (discussing need for tolerance in language rights); see also Perea, supra
note 2, at 271-281 (noting that to Framers phrase "E Pluribus Unum" meant union composed of ethnically different peoples). See generally MICHAEL KAMMEN, PEOPLE OF PARADOX
92-126 (1972) (discussing pluralism in American history).
6 See H.R.J. Res. 81, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) [hereinafter H.R.J. Res. 81] (proposing
English Amendment to U.S. Constitution). See generally Harris,710 F. Supp. at 31 (hoping
there will never be official language in United States); Note, 'Official English'. FederalLimits on Efforts to Curtail Bilingual Services in the States, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1345, 1346
(1987) [hereinafter FederalLimits] (noting that official English movement on national level
has been curtailed).
7 See ALA. CONST. amend. 509; ARiz. CONST. art. XXVIII (1988); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 1-4117 (Michie 1997); CAL. CONsT. art. III, § 6 (1986); COLO. CONST. art. III, § 30a; FLA. CONST.
art. II, § 9 (1986); GA. LAws 529; HAw. CONST. art. XV, § 4; 5 ILL. Comp. STAT. 460/20 (West
1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 1-2-10-1 (Michie 1997); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2.013 (Michie 1997);
MIss. CODE ANN. § 3-3-31 (1997); NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 27; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 145-12 (1997);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-02-13 (1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1-696 (Law Co-op. 1997); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 4-1-404 (1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-212.1 (Michie 1997).
8 See Arnold H. Leibowitz, Language and the Law: The Exercise of Political Power
Through Official Designationof Language, in LANGUAGE AND POLITICS 431, 463 (William
OBarr & Jean O'Barr eds., 1976) (noting adverse affect of enmity toward racially different
groups).

9 See The English LanguageAmendment: Hearingon S.J. Res. 167 Before the Subcomm.
on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1984)
(statement of S.I. Hayakawa, Co-Founder, U.S. English) (positing that bilingual education
is new threat to our society, introduced by self-interested Hispanic leaders seeking to secure employment for bilingual teachers); see also The English LanguageAmendment: Hearing on S.J. Res. 167 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1984) [hereinafter S.J. Res. 167] (statement of Sen.
Denton) (asserting that English is second language in some areas); S.J. Res. 13, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (instituting proposal by Senator Steve Symms of constitutional
amendment declaring English official language). Cf Thongvanh v. Thalacker, 17 F.3d 256,
259 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that not allowing inmate to communicate in Lao to family
violated his rights to free speech, due process and equal protection); Garcia v. Spun Steak
Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding employer's English-only rule violated
equal protection because it disproportionately affected Hispanic workers).
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transgresses constitutional boundaries. 10 These laws have been
challenged on both First 1 and Fourteenth' 2 Amendment grounds.
Recently, the Supreme Court of the United States vacated,
based on standing, a Ninth Circuit decision which struck down an
amendment to the Arizona Constitution declaring English the official language of that state. 13 This Note, however, will not focus on
the Supreme Court decision but instead will discuss the Ninth
Circuit's decision, since the Supreme Court's decision was based
on procedural grounds. In Yniguez v. Arizonans For Official English, 4 the United States Court of Appeals found that official English legislation was inconsistent with the First Amendment.' 5 The
infringement of constitutional rights based on equal protection,
due process and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,16 under
the rubric of "English-only rules" were, however, left unanswered
by the Yniguez court.' 7
This Note maintains that in a society as diverse as ours, tolerance for dissimilarity should be at its apogee, and thus justifica10 See H.R.J. Res. 81, supra note 6 (attempting to establish English as official language);
S.J. Res. 13, supra note 9 (attempting to establish English as official language); see also
Yniguez v. Arizonians for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussing
constitutionality of official English legislation), vacated sub noma., Arizonians for Official
English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055 (1997).
11 See U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. The First Amendment states in pertinent part: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
12 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
13 See Amiz. CONST. amend. XVIII (stating in part that"... all government functions...
[including state, government officials, employees, etc.] must.., act in English and no other
language"); see also Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 934-35 (finding that Article XVIII "chills" speech).
14 69 F.3d 920, 939 (9th Cir. 1995).
15 See id. The court held the Arizona provision making English the official state language and prohibiting all government employees from speaking languages other than English in performing their official duties violated the First Amendment. Id. In Yniguez, a
Spanish speaking state employee who handled medical malpractice claims for claimants
who did not speak English, was forced to refrain from speaking Spanish to Spanish speaking clients for fear of losing her job. Id. She then brought an action against the state seeking an injunction to prevent the enforcement of this legislation and seeking a declaration
that the amendment was unconstitutional based on the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id.; see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 17 (1971). The Court undertook a
thorough evaluation of freedom of speech. Id.
16 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988) (stating that Title VII prohibits discrimination based
on sex, national origin, race, color and religion in workforce).
17 See Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 936 (noting that other languages are spoken not of pure capriciousness but of genuine need to convey information to non-English speaking individuals).
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tions set forth in opposition to non-English languages are innocuous. Part One examines both the motivations behind officialEnglish legislation and the legitimate state objectives to be
achieved by the legislation. Part Two discusses Yniguez as set
forth by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Part Three explores
the rationale used by the Yniguez court in finding official-English
legislation unconstitutional based on First Amendment grounds
with particular focus on the intrusion of employee and individual
rights. Part Four analyzes official-English legislation in the context of equal protection. Part Five asserts that the passage of
English only legislation inherently violates due process rights. Finally, this Note concludes that official-English legislation could
not be considered constitutional either on First Amendment,
Fourteenth Amendment or Title VII grounds.
I.

OFFICIAL ENGLISH JUSTIFICATIONS

8
Proponents of official-English legislation use national unity'
and unfounded fears of undermining national security as rationales to legitimize their efforts. 19 These arguments contend that
language differences encourage divisiveness among people in this

18 See Ronald Takaki & Linda Chavez, Are the MulticulturalExperiments Working? Two
Views, WASH. POST EDUC. REv., Aug 1, 1993, at 1 (asserting that demands for multilingual
instruction inculcates separatism); see also William G. Milan, Comment, Undressing the
English Language Amendment, 60 Iwr'L J. Soc. LANGUAGE 93, 95 (1986) (asserting that
greatest myth is that there is necessary connection between speaking English and being
American); William C. Anderson, The Power of Language:A Callfor a Common Language,
ST. PETERSBURG TuEs, May 23, 1993, at 1D (stating that if English is not adopted as official language nationwide divisiveness will continue to grow). But cf Donna M. Greenspan,
Symposium, Twenty-Five Years and Counting: FloridaConstitutionof 1968 PartI: Individual Rights, Florida'sOfficial English Amendment, 18 NovA L. REV. 891, 892 (1994) (supporting English'only legislation for reasons other than national unity, such as curtailing
bilingual classes, or purely symbolic reasons).
19 See Anthony J. Califa, Declaring English the Official Language: Prejudice Spoken
Here, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 293 (1989) (stating that hidden inside velvet glove of
national unity is iron fist of prejudice and discrimination); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 400-01 (1923) (prohibiting teaching of any subject in language other than English
arose out of concerns for national security and animosity towards foreigners and bore no
reasonable relation to any state aim, thereby depriving teachers and parents of liberty
without due process of law); Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 944 (stating justifications such as national
unity, political stability, promoting common language); Perea, supra note 2, at 272 (discussing that language and national unity are intertwined); cf Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 217-19 (1944) (holding that curfew orders and forced relocation applicable
only to persons of Japanese ancestry were not violative of equal protection as "pressing
public necessity may sometimes justify racial restrictions").
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country.2 ° Proponents believe that linguistic diversity may lead to
problems of separatism and conflicts among citizenry much like
the "Canadian experience," where language differences have been
blamed for the growing divisiveness throughout the country. 2 '
Fears that English will become extinct is another reason why
this legislation is championed.2 2 Some say that these fears are
meritless or, at least, greatly overstated because of the wide use of
English internationally. 23 Proponents further contest that officialEnglish legislation must be enacted in order to encourage nonEnglish speaking residents to learn the English language. 24 This
is based on the myth that non-English speaking citizens choose to
remain linguistically ignorant.2 5 Many, for whom English is not
20 See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371 (1991) (discussing divisiveness of language); see also S.J. Res. 167, supra note 6 at 11 (statement of Senator Denton) (pointing
out that our national unity depends on societal imposition of English).
21 See Orlando Patterson, Black Like All of Us, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 1993, at C2 (suggesting that multiculturalism will lead to "balkanization"); see also Jacques Brossard, Le
droit du peuple quebecois a l'autodeterminationet a l'independence, 8 ETUDES INTERNATIONALES 151, 153-54 (1977) (describing first attempt at separation commencing with election of
Parti Quebecois in Quebec in 1976 until narrow defeat of"l'association-souverainete" referendum in 1980); Califa, supra note 19, at 293 (citing differences in Canada between French
speaking Quebec and English speaking Canada and citing Belgium and Sri Lanka as nations divided as result of language multilinguality); Patricia Chisolm, Weathering the
Storm in Canada, MAcLEAN's, Sept. 28, 1992 (describing Quebec's imminent attempts at
secession as result of worsened cultural and linguistic conflicts between Quebec and rest of
Canada.
22 See, e.g., C. SCHMID & R. BRISCHETTO, SOCIAL BASIS OF SUPPORT AND OPPOSITION FOR
THE ENGLISH ONLY MovEMENT AMONG ANGLOS AND LATINOs 2 (1989). Study data shows

that there is wide support for English language legislation among voters. Id. at 20. This
stems from "a general perception that [the United States] is losing ground." Id. This reflects a response that prompts the creation of "mythical and simplistic stereotyped scapegoats." Id. at 20.; cf Jack Citrin et al., The "Official English" Movement and the Symbolic
Politics of Language in the United States, 43 W. POL. Q. 535, 548-58 (1990). In addition to
'anti-minority" sentiments, support for "Official English" provisions stems from positive
attachment to symbols of nationhood. Id.
23 See Alfonso v. Board of Review, Dep't of Labor and Indus., 444 A.2d 1075, 1083 (N.J.
1982) (Wilentz, C.J., dissenting) (stating that providing translations was no threat to national unity or English language); Califa, supra note 19, at 322 (stating that English is
universal language); Perea, supra note 2, at 278 (noting that during times of national
stress Americans lash out at those who are different); see also John K Gamble & Charlotte
Ku, Choice of Language in Bilateral Treaties: Fifty Years of Changing State Practice, 3
INT'L & Com. L. REV. 233, 238 (1993) (explaining that Latin was "lingua franca" of most
treaties until eighteenth century, eventually replaced by French through this century,
which was overtaken by English as "lingua franca" for international treaties). See generally
France:LanguageDefenders Take Crusade to Cyberspace, OrrAwA CITIZEN, Mar. 11, 1996,
at C10 (noting English dominates computer world-wide net).
24 See Irritationand Intrigue, supranote 5, at 804 (recognizing utility of bilingual education and positing that in situations, such as posted road signs, requiring that English be
spoken is public safety interest).
25 See Alfonso, 444 A.2d at 1083 (Wilentz, C.J., dissenting) (stating that non-English
speaking Americans do not need added incentive, because they are continuously reminded
of their minority status); see also Greenspan, supra note 18, at 913, (citation omitted) (stating that it is "a socioeconomic imperative for United States immigrants to learn English");
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their primary language, however, are cognizant that speaking
English is a crucial step for successful communication in
America. 26 Non-English speaking citizens crowd bilingual classes
that teach English as a second language. Thus, contentions that
official-English will provide an incentive for non-English speaking
citizens to learn the language are unsupported.28
Supporters of official-English legislation also claim that these
laws will not affect American citizens because part of becoming an
American citizen requires passing an exam which, in part, tests
English literacy. It would appear that only illegal immigrants are
adversely affected by English-only laws.29 These laws, however,
may effectively discriminate against citizens. For example, a
large population of Native American Indians, who communicate in
their native language, would be adversely affected by this legislation. They, like other non-English speaking persons, are punished
because these laws prohibit the government from communicating
cf Pre-Cuban Miami Was a Good Place to Live, MIAmi

HERALD, Oct. 15, 1990, at 8A
(describing biases against Latino population in Miami).
26 See Califa, supra note 19, at 321 (stating that immigrants are cognizant that unless
they speak English they will not reap some benefits of this country). See generally The
Naturalization Act of 1906, ch. 3592, § 8, 34 Stat. 596, 599 (providing in pertinent part that
"no alien shall hereafter be naturalized or admitted as a citizen of the United States who
can not speak the English language"); Susan Headden et al., One Nation, One Language?
Would Making English the Nation's Official Language Unite the Country or Divide it?: Only
English Spoken Here, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 25, 1995 (suggesting economic incentive of learning English). But cf. In re Rodriguez, 81 F. Supp. 337, 353 (W.D. Tex. 1897)
(finding illiteracy in English and Spanish was not barrier for law abiding person of Mexican
descent).
27 See Deborah Gastefreud Schuss, Speaking Volumes on Culture Immigrants' Children
Find Roots to Past, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 2, 1997, at 6 (observing that Portuguese are one
example of nationalities learning English as second language); see also Mensah Dean, English: To Make it Countries Official LanguageForeignMajority is in Favor of Action, WASH.
TiMEs, Oct. 15, 1995, at C8 (discussing ESL programs and importance of speaking English);
Patrick McDonnell, Learning the Language of Citizenship Immigrants: National Debate
Spurs a Rush to Gain English and Civics Skills, L.A. TiMEs, Aug. 3, 1996, at Al (observing
people of various nationalities flocking to English as Second Language classes); William
Trombley, California Elections English-Only Proposition Kindles Minorities Fears, L.A.
TIMEs, Oct. 12, 1986, at 1 (stating immigrants want to learn English). But see Katherine L.
O'Connor, An Overview of Illegal ImmigrationAlong The United States Border,4 J. INTL L.
& PRAc. 585, 595 (stating that immigrants have no desire to assimilate or learn to speak
English).
28 See FederalLimits, supra note 6, at 1345 (suggesting that increased government services in languages other than English reduces immigrants' incentive to learn language). But
see Linda Chavez, Bilingual Education Gobbles Kids Taxes ,USA TODAY, June 15, 1994, at
A15 (contending that bilingual classes provide disincentive for students to learn English).
29 See Perea, supra note 2, at 332-40 (demonstrating development of requirements for
United States citizenship, including ability to speak English); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1423
(1988) (requiring knowledge of English language for citizenship); Petition of Contreas, 100
F. Supp. 419, 419 (S.D. Cal. 1951) (requiring testimony in English for citizenship); In re
Swenson, 61 F. Supp. 376 (D. Or. 1945) (requiring capacity to speak English).
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with its citizens in any language other than English. Additionally, taking away the rights of legal or illegal immigrants is violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This clause states in part that "every person" is protected by the
Constitution, not just every citizen. It is here noted that imposing
linguistic conformity through official-English language laws,
rather than perpetuating unity, might actually engender hostility
and social unrest."
II.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS AND YNIGUEZ

In Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English,3 1 the Ninth Circuit
struck down an amendment to the Arizona Constitution commanding that the government "act" in English only. 32 This case
involved a state employee, who brought an action against several
defendants, including the State of Arizona.3 3 Yniguez, a Latina,
working in a division which processed malpractice claims against
the state, spoke to monolingual claimants in Spanish while performing her duties.3 4 Subsequent to the passage of Article XVIII,
Yniguez refrained from speaking in any language other than English for fear of being sanctioned. 3 5 Yniguez instituted an action
claiming that the legislation unconstitutionally restricted freedom
of speech, abrogated individual rights to due process and equal
protection of the law. 36 Ignoring arguments of constitutional infringement based on either equal protection or due process
grounds, the court restricted its holding to a First Amendment
analysis. 37 The Ninth Circuit found the Arizona amendment over30 See, e.g., DENIS BARON, THE ENGLISH-ONLY QUESTION 56, 180 (1990) (stating that
there are countereffects to legitimate state interests such as national dissolution and exacerbation of racial tensions between non-English speaking and English speaking
individuals).
31 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995).
32 Id. at 947 (holding that Arizona's Article XVIII unconstitutional).
33 See id. at 925. The named defendants included the State of Arizona, Arizona Governor
Rose Mofford, Arizona Attorney General Robert Corbin, and the Director of the Arizona
Department of Administration Catherine Eden. Id.
34 See id.
35 See id.
36 See id. at 928 (noting that Arizona Attorney General proffered limited reading of Article XVIII, implying that act only means "official acts" and that it reflects government's
desire to allow speaking language other than English when it facilitates governmental
operations).
37 See id. at 925 n.7 (noting court did not reach other constitutional arguments once it
found First Amendment transgression); see also Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497
U.S. 62, 72 (1990) (upholding First Amendment challenge to infringement of public em-
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broad on its face because it limitlessly restricted speech in numerous instances.38 In Yniguez, the court found that the Arizona
amendment limited speech overbroadly because official-English
laws have various implications; they not only restrict employees'
freedom of speech but also restrict the rights of non-English
speaking individuals to receive information. 3 9 The Yniguez court
noted that Arizona's prohibition of governmental use of non-English languages would yield absurd results. 40 For example, such a
prohibition would prevent state universities from issuing diplomas in Latin, prevent a rabbi from saying Mazel Tov at a wedding,
and prevent legislators from speaking to their constituents in a
language other than English. 4
III.

FIRST AMENDMENT ARGUMENT

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits governmental restrictions on speech.4 2 To constitutionally restrict freedom of speech, there must be a narrowly tailored statute
which promotes a compelling governmental interest.4 3
A.

Content v. Conduct and the O'Brien Test

Conduct based legislation is generally deemed constitutional
whereas punishing "content," "expression" or "pure speech" is
deemed unconstitutional.4 Proponents of official-English legislation assert that the restriction on speech is conduct-based rather
ployee's rights by government); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (stating that
government can not deny benefit because speech was protected).
38 See Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 932-947 (holding on several independent grounds under First
Amendment that Arizona Official English statute was facially overbroad). But see Brown v.
Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 (1980) (finding substantial governmental interest and therefore
no violation of First Amendment).
39 See Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 923.
40 See id. at 931 (giving examples of possible results under Article XVIII).
41 See id. at 932. See, e.g., Saucedo v. Brothers Well Serv., Inc., 464 F. Supp. 919, 921
(S.D. Tex. 1979) (holding that blanket prohibition on uses of languages other than English
was overbroad as applied to "a casual Spanish phrase in a context which caused no failure
of communication and no danger").
42 See id. at 923 (noting severity of repressing "foreign" language use); Id. at 935 (stating
that "[l]anguage is by definition speech, and the regulation of any language is the regulation of speech").
43 See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (stating there must be
important governmental interest for law to be constitutional).
44 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 397 (1989) (concerning flag burning as
means of expression and speech); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 503 (1969) (noting that wearing arm band was speech and expression); O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367 (noting that government restriction of burning draft card was constitutional,
and did not abrogate free speech rights).
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than content-based. 45 In analyzing this distinction between content-based and conduct-based legislation, courts examine the purpose behind the speech or conduct.46 If what is being conveyed is a
message, then the actions or speech are content-based and will be
safeguarded under the First Amendment. 47 Official-English legislation is not conduct-based because communication through
speech is inherently self expression.s As such, restrictions on language use are considered restrictions on "content-based speech."49
While it is argued that selectively choosing to speak a language
should be deemed "conduct," the court has rejected this reasoning,
rendering it clear that choice of language statutes are contentbased legislation.5 °
1. The O'Brien Test
In United States v. O'Brien,51 a test was established to evaluate
restrictions on "expression" under the First Amendment. 52 The
test determines whether such governmental restrictions on "freedom of expression" are permissive under the First Amendment.53
Thus a state may be permitted to pass legislation that infringes on
individual rights if: (i) it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; (ii) that interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (iii) the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms5 4is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest.
2. Yniquez and O'Brien
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that the Arizona Amendment failed to meet the requirements of
45 See Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 934 (noting that proponents make distinction between pure
speech and expressive conduct).
46 See id.
47 See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18-23 (1971) (noting that profane statements by individual were not conduct, but content based, and such speech was protected
under First Amendment).
48 See, e.g., O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 388 (stating that burning draft card was conduct and
therefore criminalization was constitutional).
49 See Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 934-935.
50 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1974) (explaining test to determine whether
speech existed was whether "an intent to convey a message was present") (quoting Spence
v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1970))).
51 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
52 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (setting forth test for expressive conduct).
53 See id.
54 Id.
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the O'Brien test.5 5 The court in Yniguez found that an important
or substantial interest was not being promoted.5" While the government claimed the goals of the statute were efficiency and effectiveness, it was completely inefficient and ineffective for an employee to wait to get an interpreter rather than speak to
individuals in their native language. 5 7 Furthermore, the court
concluded that excluding speech in any language but English was
not a sufficiently narrowly tailored means of establishing state
interests.58
B.

Overbreadth

The doctrine of overbreadth is invoked when restrictions on individual speech will undermine the rights of third parties. 9 Legislation will be considered overbroad if there is a danger that a constitutional infirmity exists."0 Arizona's Article XVIII is facially
overbroad because it not only prevented Yniguez from speaking in
languages other than English, but it violates the rights of numerous individuals to receive information.6 1
1.

Employee Rights

In Yniguez, proponents attempted to distinguish between governmental employees and individuals. 2 These distinctions, however, are dispositive because, despite the context, there is an en55 See Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 934 n.17 (requiring that under O'Brien certain tests be met
and that Article XVIII of Arizona Constitution failed to meet these tests).
56 See id.
57 See Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 924 n.4 (noting that employing bilingual worker was efficient).
58 See id. at 932
59 See Lind v. Grimmer, 30 F.3d 1115, 1122-23 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that statute limiting freedom of speech was overbroad and unconstitutional); see also Board of Airport
Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987) (noting that statute is overbroad when
there is resulting chilling of third party rights); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491,
503 (1985) (noting that doctrine of overbreadth assists in protecting individuals' rights
without need for actual individual to bring action, for fear of repercussions, but individual
is still protected if other person brings action).
60 See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613, 615 (1973) (concluding that legislation
was unconstitutional because of overbreadth doctrine); see also New York State Club Ass'n
v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988) (discussing application of overbreath doctrine);
Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 (1984)
(noting that overbreath doctrine is applicable in many situations where First Amendment
is violated).
61 See Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 932 (discussing how interests of many individuals was violated by failure to disseminate information).
62 See id. at 928 n.12 (construing provision of Article XVIII to apply only to state
employees).
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croachment on First Amendment rights. 3 Courts have held that
the government is allowed more latitude when dealing with employees' freedom of speech rights than with individual freedom of
speech rights. 6 4 Thus, when acting in a "master-servant" relationship, the state's interest in attaining its goals efficiently and effectively are magnified."
Additionally, advocates for official English legislation attempt
to distinguish between speech of public and private concern.
Although speech of public concern is afforded greater constitutional protection than speech of private concern, employees cannot
be admonished for speaking on matters not relating to their employment because private speech is also constitutionally protected. 6 6 Restrictions on speech, whether they be of a public or private nature, may not be arbitrarily imposed. 7 In order to restrict
speech of public concern, the government must have a compelling
interest, other than mere efficiency.68 As noted in Yniguez, official-

63 See id. at 940 (explaining that although there are different approaches concerning
controlling speech of government and private employers, these distinctions were irrelevant
in determining case outcome).
64 See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 670 (1994) (plurality opinion) (noting less restrictive standards are placed for public employees); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 147 (1983) (mentioning right of government in limiting employee speech); Pickering v.
Board of Educ. of Township High Sch. Dist., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (discussing how government must meet requirements of test to impose restrictions on employees' speech). See,
e.g., Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270-71 (5th Cir. 1980) (upholding dismissal of bilingual
salesman because he was bilingual and chose to violate rule).
65 See Waters, 511 U.S. at 662 (mentioning consideration given as enlarging state interests); see also Connick, 461 U.S. at 146-47 (regarding First Amendment as protecting employee's speech if it concerns public matters); Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 938 (citing Martin v.
Parrish, 805 F.2d 538, 584 (5th Cir. 1986)) (noting that government is entitled to restrict
employee speech in some areas).
66 See Waters, 511 U.S. at 663 (holding whether content of employee speech is protected
under First Amendment depends on whether speech was matter of public or private concern); Connick, 461 U.S. at 146-147 (holding that where content of employee speech was
not of public concern, then matter left to discretion of employer); see also Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987) (expressing that private speech is protected by First
Amendment).
67 See Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 938 (holding that amendment to Arizona Constitution mandating use of English by "all government officials and employees during performance of
government business" violated First Amendment free speech protections). See, e.g., Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (acknowledging that government has expansive powers
in arena of government "acts" yet power is not subject to exceptions).
68 See Waters, 511 U.S. at 673. "A government employee, like any citizen, may have a
strong, legitimate interest in speaking out on public matters. In many such situations, the
government may have to make a substantial showing that the speech is, in fact, likely to be
disruptive before it may be punished." Id.
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English hinders, rather than enhances, the efficiency and effectiveness of governmental business. 9
2.

Right to Receive Information - National Treasury

The First Amendment protects "freedom of discussion" which
necessarily implies protection not only for the speaker and provider of information but also for the audience and the consumer of
information.7 Proponents of official-English laws suggest that
although a barrier is erected by a failure to provide non-English
speaking individuals with information in their respective language, there is no affirmative right to receive information in the
language of your choice. 7 As mentioned in United States v. National Treasury Employees Union,7 2 the right to receive information is included within the freedom of speech guaranteed by the
First Amendment.7 3 Some courts have hesitated to hold that there
are affirmative rights to receive information.7 4 The right to receive
information, however, is inextricably tied to both the freedom of
speech and due process guarantees, and policies of non-dissemination of information to non-English speaking individuals in other
languages violates both the First and Fourteenth Amendments.75
It is also argued that, while there is no affirmative right, at the
very least, there is a "negative" right to decline the receipt of information. Thus, Article XVIII of the Arizona Constitution, by failing to provide non-English speaking individuals with information
69 See Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 941 (providing examples of how Article XVIII adversely affects
government business).
70 See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976) (holding First Amendment implicates right to receive information).
71 See Guadelupe Org. Inc. v. Tempe Elementary Sch. Dist. No.3, 587 F.2d 1022, 1024
(9th Cir. 1978) (holding there is no right to bilingual education); see also Carmona v. Sheffield, 475 F.2d 738, 739 (9th Cir. 1973) (deciding there is no right to notices in Spanish);
Frontera v. Sindell, 522 F.2d 1215, 1216 (6th Cir. 1975) (stating no right to take civil service exam in Spanish).
72 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
73 See id. at 455 (expressing right of public to read and hear government statement by
employees); Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
866-68 (1982) (discussing role of First Amendment in fostering individual self-expression
and in affording public access to discussions, debates, dissemination of information and
ideas); see also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756-57 (noting that First
Amendment protects receiver of information).
74 See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 196-197
(1989) (discounting proposition that there are "affirmative obligations" imposed on
governments).
75 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 562 (1969) (noting constitutional protection of
right to receive information); Pico, 457 U.S. at 86 (stating there is right to receive ideas
necessary to rights of free speech, press and political freedom).
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in their respective languages, erects a barrier to the receipt of information.7 6 The provision serves to exclude a part of the population from participating in the political process and democracy in
general.7 7
3.

Title VII

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196471 is a broad remedial
statute intended to strike at many forms of discrimination which
may not be actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment. 79 The
objective behind the passage of Title VII was to eliminate discrimination in the workplace.8 0 Title VII prohibits discrimination
based on national origin.8 ' The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) has promulgated instructions on what is considered national origin discrimination. 2 Official-English laws
have been interpreted by the EEOC and the Supreme Court to be
a form of national origin discrimination." Because of this, many
argue that official-English laws are in violation of Title VII.8 4 The
EEOC has specifically interpreted English-only laws, which require that English be the only language spoken in the workplace,
as violations of Title VII.8 - Title VII, however, is not transgressed

when the law limits the speech of other languages to breaks and
76 See Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 936 (9th Cir. 1995).
77 See Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 936.
78 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1) (Supp. V 1993) (making it unlawful for employer "to discriminate against any individual with respect to his... conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin").
79 See id. See generally Chai R. Feldblum, The Moral Rhetoric of Legislation, 72 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 992, 1002 (1997) (discussing Title VII prohibitions).
80 See generally Irritationand Intrigue, supra note 5, at 795 (mentioning how Title VII
has been utilized to protect minorities in work arena).
81 See Beth H. Storper, Comment, English-Only Policies in The Workplace as Title VII
National OriginDiscrimination:Garcia v. Spun Steak, 8 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 603, 603 (1994)
(discussing that Title VII protects against national origin discrimination).
82 See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (1993) (stating that national origin discrimination is "the denial of equal employment opportunity because of an individual's, or his or her ancestor's,
place of origin, or because an individual has the physical, cultural or linguistic characteristics of a national origin group"); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (a) (1991) (mentioning that
"prohibiting employees at all time in the workplace, from speaking their primary language
...
disadvantages an individual's employment opportunities on the basis of national origin"). See, e.g., Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980) (discussing importance of
individual's language and ties to national and racial identity). .
83 See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 353 (1991) (plurality opinion) (noting that
"proficiency in a particular language, like skin color, should be treated as a surrogate for
race under an equal protection analysis").
84 See Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1480, 1480 (9th Cir. 1993) (allowing employer to
pass English only rule without showing any business necessity).
85 See Storper, supra note 81, at 619-20 (explaining that EEOC balances language restriction with possible effect of national origin discrimination).
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lunch, providing the employer has demonstrated a business necessity of having English be the only spoken language, particularly
when in contact with monolinguistic customers.8 6 It is submitted
that the Arizona Amendment is in violation of Title VII because it
blanketly disallows the speech of any language but English in any
situation. The author further argues, that were this Amendment
to limit the speech of other languages at specified times, it would
nevertheless be in violation of Title VII because the state has not
demonstrated a business necessity that only English be spoken in
the workplace. In fact, as conceded by the state, it was actually
more efficient to allow employees to speak to clients and customers in that person's native language.8 7
IV.

EQUAL PROTECTION

One of the goals of the Fourteenth Amendment is to eliminate
discrimination. 8 8 This goal is attained by deeming discrimination
based on race,89 gender, 9° or national origin 9 1 unconstitutional.
86 See generally United States v. N.L. Indus. Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 364-66 (8th Cir. 1973)
(mentioning need for there to be business necessity).
87 See Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 924 n.4 (9th Cir. 1995)
(agreeing that employee's use of Spanish was efficient).
88 See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (holding that core premise of Fourteenth Amendment is to eliminate all government imposed discrimination).
89 See Powers v. Ohio, 199 U.S. 400, 410 (1991) (holding that under Equal Protection
Clause, criminal defendants may object to race-based exclusions'of jurors even though they
are not of same race); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that Virginia statute prohibiting marriage between whites and non-whites violated Equal Protection Clause); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 194-195 (1964) (holding race as suspect
class); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 497 (1954) (determining that racial segregation of
District of Columbia Schools was unconstitutional). See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, 84 (1986) (stating that use of peremptory challenges merely for race based issues
was unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
90 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199 (1976) (holding gender-based classifications
must serve important governmental aims and must be substantially related to achieving
such aims).
91 See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 481 (1954) (holding national origin suspect
class, discriminating based on surnames, was same as discrimination based on national
origin); see also Oxamo v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-646 (1948) (ruling that state statute
prohibiting ownership of land by son of Chinese immigrant was unconstitutional);
Hirabayshi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (recognizing that legislative classifications based on ancestry were subject to strict scrutiny but were upheld because of nations
interest at wartime); Craino v. University of Okla. Bd. of Regents, 750 F.2d 815, 819 (10th
Cir. 1984) (noting demotion based on accent is disallowed as discrimination based on national origin); Berke v. Ohio Dep't of Public Welfare, 628 F.2d 980, 981 (6th Cir. 1980)
(discrimination based on accent is unconstitutional because it was based on national
origin).
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This goal has been partly successful in reigning in discrimination
through substantive due process and equal protection analysis. 92
Nativism,s3 a counterforce continuing to grow in reaction to an
increasing number of minorities asserting constitutional rights, is
currently being used to retard linguistic diversity. 94 While nativism itself is not entirely negative, problems do arise when, under
its cloak, the majority tramples upon individual rights in favor of
reasserting its sociocultural, political, and linguistic dominance. 9 5
The Constitution protects every individual's rights regardless of
popular trends. 9 6 "Although the Constitution may not control private prejudices because they are beyond the law's reach, the law
cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect." 9 7 States in the
past have attempted to restrict the use of foreign languages. 9
Courts have found these endeavors unconstitutional based on
equal protection grounds. 99 Reasons given by state legislatures in
support of official-English legislation do not pass constitutional
92 See generally Kenneth L. Karst, Citizenship Race & Marginality, 30 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1, 1 (1988) (explaining that Fourteenth Amendment protects certain individuals from
feeling like inferior caste).
93 See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED 1817 (1981) (defining nativism as "the practice or policy of favoring native-born citizens as distinguished from
immigrants").
94 Cf Martina Stewart, English-Only Laws, InformationalInterests and the Meaning of
the First Amendment in a PluralisticSociety, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 539, 539 (1996)
(suggesting that government duty is to promote assimilation).
95 See Joshua Fishman, Language an Ethnicity, in LANGUAGE, ETHNICITY AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS 133-34 (Howard Giles ed., 1977) (asserting that English only movement
stems from "anglo-oriented middle class Americans" worried about their loss of social and
political power); see also Richard L. Berke, PoliticiansDiscovering an Issue: Immigration,
N.Y. TMES, Mar. 8, 1994, at A19 (discussing politicians using immigrants as scapegoats for
economic and social problems). But see Puerto Rican Org. for Political Action v. Kusper, 490
F.2d. 575, 577 (7th Cir. 1973) (noting that official English legislation has no real effect, but
is purely symbolic).
96 See Irritation and Intrigue, supra note 5, at 808 (stating that English movement
trumps linguistic minorities rights).
97 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984). See generally Palmer v. Thompson, 403
U.S. 217, 260-61 (1971) (White, J., dissenting) (stating that private prejudices cannot be
used to effectuate segregation).
98 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (finding statute prohibiting teaching
in language other than English unconstitutional); see also Farrington v. Tokushige, 273
U.S. 284, 298 (1927) (invalidating statute prohibiting use of foreign language); Yu Cong
Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 527-28 (1926) (determining that state restriction on maintaining business records in foreign language unconstitutional); Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S.
404, 409 (1923) (invalidating provision prohibiting teaching of language other than
English).
99 See Farrington,273 U.S. at 298 (finding it unconstitutional to restrict languages other
than English from being used). But see Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 13 F.3d 296, 298 (9th Cir.
1993) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (discussing that English only laws appear to be form of
national origin discrimination).
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muster,' 0 0 because these reasons are neither legitimate nor compelling state interests.' 0 ' In Meyer v. Nebraska, °2 the seminal
language case, it was held that the Constitution shelters the liberty interests of parents to employ teachers to teach children in
languages other than English. 03 This case, like many others of its
time, were decided on substantive due process grounds.' 4 Modern
day analysis has veered from a substantive due process rationale
in this area, instead utilizing10 an
equal protection rationale under
5
the Fourteenth Amendment.

A.

The Three-Tiered Analysis

The United States Supreme Court has established three standards of review to analyze claims arising under the Fourteenth
Amendment.' 0

6

Strict scrutiny, 10

7

heightened scrutiny,10 8 and ra-

100 See Califa, supra note 19, at 331-46 (stating that these laws are unconstitutional
under all but rational basis review).
101 See generally Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 968
(noting that imprecise methods of achieving governmental interests are unconstitutional).
102 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
103 See id. at 402 (stating that legislature could not impose such restrictions without
doing violence to both letter and spirit of Constitution); Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 409
(1923) (striking down statutes in Ohio and Iowa requiring English language as medium of
instruction in secular schools); see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927)
(finding that rights of free speech and right to assemble are fundamental rights incorporated under Fourteenth Amendment); Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298 (1927)
(invalidating Hawaiian territorial statute that imposed stringent regulation upon foreign
language schools); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (stating that freedom of
speech and press are among liberties protected against impairment by states); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment prevented Oregon from requiring children of certain age to attend public school).
104 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 398 (1923) (discussing that during early part of
twentieth century, equal protection was not desirable means used to attack discrimination,
instead substantive due process was utilized); see also Farrington,273 U.S. at 298-99 (holding Territorial Act severely restricting expression and substance of what was taught in
foreign languages violated due process); Bartels, 262 U.S. at 409 (finding that rule requiring that all school branches be taught in English was violation of equal protection).
105 See Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 400 (1943) (recognizing that equal protection of laws
must be followed by states); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 356 (1886) (stating that
Equal Protection Clause is used to protect all people). See generally Takahashi v. Fish &
Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948) (including aliens as protected under Equal Protection Clause).
106 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-441 (1985) (delineating constitutional standards of review). See generally Laura A. Cordero, Constitutional
Limitation on Official English Declaration,20 N. MEx. L. REv. 17, 41 (1990) (discussing
strict scrutiny and English only laws).
107 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (citation omitted) (reasoning that strict scrutiny finds
classification of statute by race, alienage, or national origin is seldom relevant to achieve
legitimate state interest); see also Greenspan, supra note 18, at 912 (discussing application
of strict scrutiny). But see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (demonstrating instances where legislation was held constitutional, despite use of strict scrutiny
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tional basis review1" 9 are used in determining whether individual
rights have been violated under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Each standard requires the application of a two-prong test, 110
which balances governmental interests and the means used to attain stated goals. Strict scrutiny is utilized when a suspect classification is established in legislation based on race, alienage, national origin to protect against discrimination"1 or when a
fundamental right" 2 is abrogated. 1 3 The Supreme Court stated
in Hernandez v. New York," 4 that official-English legislation creates a suspect classification because suppression of languages
other than English has been equated to discrimination based on
national origin." 5 Recognizing language discrimination as naanalysis); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 101 (1943) (upholding law excluding
Japanese from certain west coast areas as constitutional under strict scrutiny analysis).
108 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (citation omitted) (stating that intermediate scrutiny
requires important governmental interest and means used must be substantially related to
those interests); see also Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (demonstrating use of
court's use of heightened level scrutiny resulting in finding statute unconstitutional); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 718 (1982) (applying intermediate scrutiny, striking down Mississippi's policy of barring men from school); L.A. Dep't of Water
and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 715 (1978) (claiming that it was gender discrimination to require women to make higher contributions toward their pension plans because
they live longer than men).
109 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (using rational basis standard to review is presumed
valid and it will be upheld, so long as statute is rationally related to legitimate state interest; see also United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 167-175 (1980) (using
rational basis standard in deciding whether economic and social legislation offends Constitution); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) (upholding statute using rational basis review); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110-111 (1949)
(noting that under rational basis analysis, New York regulation prohibiting advertising on
vehicles did not violate Equal Protection Clause because there was rational connection between means and ends).
110 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439-441 (discussing factors to be weighed in equal protection analysis). See generally Greenspan, supra note 18, at 913 (discussing equal protection
standards relating to prohibition of non-English drivers license tests).
111 See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479-80 (1954) (holding Mexicans in community where they were systematically discriminated against were suspect class). See, e.g.,
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (stating that nationality is classification requiring strict scrutiny analysis).
112 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.15 (1982) (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 336 (1972)) (noting that right is fundamental if it is implicitly or explicitly stated in
Constitution); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973) (stating right of privacy is
fundamental).
113 See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1902 (1996) (stating that under strict scrutiny, there must be compelling state interest and means undertaken must be narrowly
drawn to achieve that interest).
114 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
115 See id.; see also Myres S. McDougal et al., Freedom from Discriminationin Choice of
Language and InternationalHuman Rights, 1 S. ILL. U. L.J. 151, 152 (1976) (arguing that
"language is commonly taken as a prime indicator of an individual's group identifications");
see also Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 434 (1982) (noting that distinctions between
aliens and citizens are inherently suspect if they affect primarily economic interests and
are therefore subject to strict judicial scrutiny); Mow Sun Wong v. Hampton, 426 U.S. 88,
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tional origin discrimination creates a suspect class, entitling
courts to examine official-English legislation using strict scrutiny
analysis.

1 16

The result of treating a classification as "suspect" is that the
statute at issue would be subjected to strict scrutiny, the highest
standard of constitutional review. 11 7 Generally, once the court embarks on a strict scrutiny analysis, the government has an "uphill"
battle in attempting to prove that the legislation is constitutional."' The government must prove that the state interest is
compelling and that the means used to achieve its interests are
narrowly tailored to achieve the desired interest. 1 19 Even if national unity, promotion of English, prevention of separatism and
decreasing costs are found to be compelling governmental inter100-01 (1976) (applying strict scrutiny analysis to statute prohibiting aliens from civil service jobs); Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 13 F.3d 296, 298 (9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (noting that "[1language is intimately tied to
national origin and cultural identity: its discriminatory suppression cannot be dismissed as
an inconvenience.. ."); Daniel J. Garfield, Comment, Don't Box Me In: The Unconstitutionality of Amendment 2 and English-only Amendments, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 690, 692 (1995)
(stating that English-only legislation discriminates against non-English speaking individuals). See generally Califa, supra note 19, at 347-48 (discussing history behind English-only
movement); Perea, supra note 2, at 370-71 (reviewing American legal history's interaction
with various languages).
116 See FederalLimits, supra note 6, at 1347 (arguing that official-English declarations,
broadly applied, impermissibly single out suspect classes for discriminatory treatment, and
are invalid attempts to block access to political process for language minorities); see also
Califa, supra note 19, at 33 (arguing that official-English laws classify people by language
similar to national origin and should also be accorded strict scrutiny standard of review).
See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (holding that state statute precluding aliens from receiving welfare is subject to strict scrutiny analysis); Hernandez, 347
U.S. at 480 (asserting that primary speakers of language are equivalent to national origin
classifications and reviewed under strict scrutiny analysis).
117 See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (stating that if government
can prove that there is compelling state interest and means used are least restrictive, legislation will be upheld under strict scrutiny analysis).
118 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985) (stating
that law will be held unconstitutional unless state can prove compelling interest); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogun, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982) (stating that party seeking to
uphold statute under strict scrutiny analysis must carry burden of showing "exceedingly
persuasive justification" for classification); Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 273 (1979) (recognizing that burden of proving justification falls on state); see also
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 79-80 (1981) (noting that courts serve as check on legislative and executive branches to confirm that Congress has not overstepped its boundaries
with regard to Constitution).
119 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (declaring that laws are subject to strict scrutiny and
only upheld if suitably tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest); Mississippi
Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 723 (suggesting that burden is met when classification serves
"important governmental objectives and that discriminatory means employed" are substantially related to achievement of those objectives); see also Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist.,
395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969) (stating that statutes are presumed unconstitutional under strict
scrutiny analysis); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) (stating that discriminating law bears heavy burden of justification).
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ests, English-only statutes would nonetheless fail strict scrutiny
review because the means undertaken to effectuate those inter120
ests are not narrowly tailored.
English-only laws also violate individual fundamental rights,
which require strict scrutiny analysis, because these laws infringe
upon the right to vote. 12 ' The right to vote is frustrated under the
guise of official English legislation which allows for only singlelanguage voting.' 22 The Voting Rights Act 1 23 states that "[nio voting qualification or prerequisite to voting. . . shall be... applied
by any state or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of
any citizen to vote because he is a member of a language minority
group."1 24 Furthermore, an individual cannot be reasonably expected to exercise her right to vote when she does not comprehend
25
what the procedure entails.
Infringement of the right to vote is particularly evident with
Native Americans and American citizens residing in Puerto
Rico.' 26 American Indians and Puerto Ricans are citizens of the
120 See Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 967-68 (1984)
(explaining that if means chosen are not narrowly tailored legislation is rightfully subjected to constitutional attack); see also Perea, supra note 2, at 338 (asserting that there
are less restrictive ways to provide incentive to learn English and achieve national unity
than official-English legislation, among them increasing funding to English classes).
121 See Montero v. Meyer, 696 F. Supp. 540, 549-550 (D. Col. 1988) (holding Hispanic
voters demonstrated likelihood of irreparable injury under Voting Rights Act in connection
with passage of proposed amendment designating English as official language); see also
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966) (holding that right to vote is
fundamental right guaranteed by Constitution); Reynold v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964)
(holding that all citizens have constitutional right to vote). But see Rosario v. Rockefeller,
410 U.S. 752, 756 (1973) (allowing restriction of voting until individual was registered for
certain period). See generally McDonald v. Board of Election, 394 U.S. 802, 802 (1969)
(demonstrating that because voting was fundamental right imprisoned voters could not be
denied absentee ballots).
122 See Califa, supra note 19, at 337 (arguing that it is invidious discrimination to take
away people's bilingual ballots because right to vote is fundamental right).
123 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (f) (2) (1988).
124 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (f) (2). See generally Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 651
(1884) (upholding right to vote for all citizens).
125 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la (1981 & Supp. 1993) (requiring publishing of bilingual
voting materials); see also Chinese for Affirmative Action v. Leguennec, 580 F.2d 1006,
1006 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating that Congress intended to stop voting discrimination). See
generally 8 U.S.C. § 1423 (1) (1988 and Supp. III 1992) (dispensing with naturalization
requirement for those over age 50 having lived in United States for 20 or more years).
126 See Puerto Rican Org. for Political Action v. Kusper, 490 F.2d 575, 578 (7th Cir. 1973)
(holding that United States citizens who attend school in Puerto Rico must be given right to
vote in language they can understand); Torres v. Sachs, 69 F.R.D. 343, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(awarding attorney fees to citizens who enforced bilingual ballots provision of Voting
Rights Act); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la (providing that no state is allowed to implement
English only voting before August 6, 2007).
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United States and, as such, possess the right to vote. 127 On American Indian reservations and in Puerto Rico, however, English is
not the primary language. 12 Should federal English-only legislation succeed, the right to vote would merely be a "token" to Native
Americans and Puerto Ricans who would not be able to understand the English-only ballot.' 29 For these reasons, official English legislation should be reviewed under a strict scrutiny analysis,' 3° either because a suspect classification exists, or because
these laws eradicate a fundamental right.' 3 '
In the unlikely event that the courts do not apply strict scrutiny, the English-only legislation should still be deemed unconstitutional because such legislation would not pass the lower standard of rational basis review.'1 2 Under this standard, legislation
127 See Puerto Rican Org. for PoliticalAction, 490 F.2d at 578, n.7 (stating that Spanish
is primary language and English is only taught as secondary language in Puerto Rican
Schools); Alfonso v. Board of Review, Dep't of Labor and Indus., 444 A.2d 1075, 1075 (N.J.
1982) (recognizing that Puerto Ricans do not need to learn English before voting); Gerald
M. Rosenberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote, 75 MICH. L. REV.
1092, 1119 (1977) (discussing effect of precluding non-English speaking people from
voting).
128 See 8 U.S.C. § 1402 (1952) (codifying that Puerto Ricans are United States citizens);
8 U.S.C. § 1423 (1970) (recognizing Puerto Ricans as citizens without knowledge of English
language); see also Puerto Rican Org. for Political Action, 490 F.2d at 578 (noting that
Puerto Ricans are United States citizens with right to vote).
129 See Puerto Rican Org. for PoliticalAction, 490 F.2d at 579 (holding that right to vote
is right to cast effective ballots; meaning that Puerto Ricans are entitled to assistance in
language they can understand); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1973 aa-la (1981 & 1993 Supp.) (guaranteeing Puerto Ricans right to vote). But see Castro v. California, 466 P.2d 244, 245 (Cal.
1970) (failing to uphold statute denying bilingual assistance in voting).
130 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-42 (1985) (citation
omitted) (explaining different standards of equal protection review); Id. at 472 (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (stating that because "prejudice spawns prejudice, and stereotypes produce
limitations, history of unequal treatment requires sensitivity"); see also Perea, supra note
2, at 332 (asserting that federal official English legislation will be reviewed under strict
scrutiny analysis). See generally Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954) (disallowing
peremptory challenges based solely on Spanish speaking ability); Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad,
271 U.S. 500, 523-25 (1926) (stating that it was violation of Equal Protection Clause to
prohibit Chinese businessmen to keep records in Chinese).
131 See Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 478 (prohibiting discrimination of Hispanics injury selection process); Yu Cong Eng, 271 U.S. at 523-25 (applying strict scrutiny to rule prohibiting
Chinese merchants keeping records in Chinese); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)
(recognizing due process rights belong to all); Perea, supra note 2, at 332 (discussing how
non-English speakers is suspect class); see also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977)
(recognizing illegitimate children as suspect class and subject to strict scrutiny analysis).
132 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (stating that rational basis review is general rule and
that legislation is presumed valid and will be upheld if classification is rationally related to
legitimate state interest). See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 96 (1979) (using rational
basis to determine validity of mandatory retirement statute); United States Dep't of Agric.
v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973) (applying rational basis standard, court struck down
federal food stamp statute which provided assistance to households of groups of related
individuals by deeming there was irrational basis). But cf.Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S.
221, 234 (1981) (stating that under most deferential standard statute, denying federal com-
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will be deemed constitutional if there is a legitimate state interest
13 3
and that the legislation is rationally related to that interest.
The government's interests in mandating official-English are mere
allegations and masked discrimination.13 As previously discussed, notions that the state has a legitimate interest in passing
official English legislation, in fact, have been negated. 35 Moreover, even if a legitimate state interest is somehow produced, such
legislation would not pass constitutional muster because invoking
a language limitation is by no means a rational means of achieving any of the aforementioned state interests. 3 6
B. Purposeful Discrimination& Administration of the Law
Violations based on the Equal Protection Clause turn on the intentions of governmental classifications. 3 v The invidious quality
of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must be traced to a
discriminatory purpose. 31 In Washington v. Davis,"3 9 the
fort allowances to needy and aged, blind and disabled persons confined in public institutions, was valid); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961) (noting that statute
providing that only certain businesses could remain open on Sundays was neither arbitrary
nor capricious and was upheld under rational (deferential) basis review); Califa, supra note
19, at 345-46 (arguing that official-English legislation would fail rational basis review).
133 See Califa, supra note 19, at 345-46 (suggesting that federal official-English statutes
will fail rational basis review because legitimate interests behind legislation have already
been satisfied); see also United States Dep't of Agric., 413 U.S. at 538 (concluding that there
was no rational basis for food stamp statute); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448 (ruling that zoning
statute forbidding mentally retarded group home did not satisfy rational basis).
134 See generally Rachel F. Moran, Bilingual Education as a Status Conflict, 75 CAL. L.
REV. 321, 345-350 (1987) (arguing "official use of language has been used by those in control of the decision-making machinery as a means of political manipulation and control").
135 See Califa, supra note 19, at 345-46 (arguing that there was no rational basis for
federal official-English language statutes). See generally Andrew P. Averbach, Language
Classifications and the Equal Protection Clause: When is Languagea Pretext for Race and
Ethnicity, 74 B.U. L. REV. 481, 487-88 (1994) (overviewing rational basis review as applied
to language discrimination); Cordero, supra note 106, at 25-28 (explaining how rational
basis review applies to official-English language statutes); FederalLimits, supra note 6, at
1353 (explaining that "[a]s a symbolic gesture, a state's declaration of English as its official
language violates no constitutional norms ... ).
136 See US. Dep't ofAgric., 413 U.S. at 538 (striking down statute using rational basis
review); see also Califa, supra note 19, at 345-47 (suggesting that federal "Official English"
statues are not rationally related to goals of national unity or providing incentive for immigrants to learn English). But see Garfield, supra note 115, at 740 (asserting that English
language statutes would survive under rational basis review).
137 See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 353 (1991) (plurality opinion) (noting that
analysis based on equal protection grounds was based on intentional discrimination); Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977) (stating that proof
of intent in racial discrimination was required to show violation of Equal Protection
Clause); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (stating that official action is not
unconstitutional solely because of racially disproportionate impact).
138 See Purkette v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768-69 (1995) (asserting court must decide when
violation of equal protection occurs if there is race neutral explanation); Hernandez, 500
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Supreme Court held that governmental action is not unconstitu140
tional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact.
be a showing by data of purposeful
There must also
14 1
discrimination.
1.

De Jure v. De Facto Legislation

In determining whether legislation purposefully discriminates
it is necessary to consider whether the legislation is "de jure" 14 2 or
"de facto. 1 43 "De jure" discrimination is action which, on its face,
is unlawful and disadvantages people based on race.' 4 4 In contrast, "de facto" legislation is governmental action that is racially
neutral on its face, but, through its administration and purpose
has a disparaging impact. 145 The distinction rests on the differU.S. at 375-76 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (finding equal protection violations required
showing of discriminatory purpose); see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93 (stating
that patterns may cause "inference of discrimination").
139 426 U.S. 229 (1979).
140 Id. at 239 (citing Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403-404 (1945)) (ruling that in order
to keep blacks offjuries, "[a] purpose to discriminate must be present which may be proven
by systematic exclusion of eligible jurymen of the proscribed race or by unequal application
of the law to such an extent as to show intentional discrimination").
141 See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-266 (1977)
(requiring proof of racially discriminatory purpose to show violation of Equal Protection
Clause); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (explaining that "our cases have not
embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially
disproportionate impact"); see also Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 362-63 (noting that purposeful
discrimination must be demonstrated, and it may be inferred from all facts). See, e.g.,
Meyer v. Nebraska 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (ruling statute prohibiting teaching of children
in different language other than English is unconstitutional under rational basis test, because it purposefully discriminates).
142 See BLACes LAw DIcTIoNARY 425 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "de jure" as "by law").
143 See id. at 416 (defining "de facto" as government action which is legal on its face, but
has discriminatory consequences).
144 See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617 (1982) (overturning statute because it
was promulgated solely to take away black voting strength); Whitecomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S.
124, 149-50 (1971) (stating that "multimember districts violate Fourteenth Amendment if
'conceived or operated as purposeful devices to further racial discrimination' by minimizing, canceling out or diluting voting strength of racial elements in voting population");
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 303-04 (1880) (declaring statute which denies
African-Americans right to participate as juror as violating equal protection).
145 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 365-67 (1886) (showing that it is unconstitutional under equal protection when ordinance issued by board gave permits to only one
Chinese applicant, yet gave permits to all non-Chinese applicants); see also Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404, 407 (1967) (overruling case where African-American was convicted of
rape by forced confession of police officers); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 404-06 (1942) (recognizing that application of excluding jurors violated equal protection). See, e.g., Edwards
v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 635 (1987) (noting discrimination behind veil of neutrality). But
see, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 220 (1971) (holding Jackson City acted constitutionally when it closed its pools subsequent to being ordered to desegregate them since
there was no showing of purposeful discrimination).
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ence between the words "purposeful" and "effect."' 4 6 While purposeful discrimination is unconstitutional,' 4 7 legislation that
merely causes a discriminatory effect is constitutional.1 4 Consequently, to establish a constitutional violation, there must be purposeful discrimination.' 4 9
By utilizing an equal protection analysis, some courts have concluded that language is a "surrogate for race" 150 and, as such, official English legislation is abhorrent because it is a pretext for discrimination.' 5 ' In recent years there has been an enormous influx
of Asian' 5 2 and Latin American' 5 3 immigrants in the United
146 See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 377-78 (Stevens and Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (claiming
that "[t]he line between discriminatory purpose and discriminatory impact is neither as
bright nor as critical as the Court appears to believe"); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
253-54 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (suggesting there is no bright line test for determining difference between discriminatory intent and discriminatory purpose); see also Yick Wo,
118 U.S. at 364-66 (noting irrelevance of whether standard was purpose or effect). But see
also Gormillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 339 (1960) (demonstrating that when there is
dramatic disproportion it does not matter whether it is denoted in terms of purpose or
effect).
147 See Rogers, 458 U.S. at 617 (holding statute unconstitutional because it dissolved
black voting power); Whitecomb, 403 U.S. at 149-50 (ruling multi-member districts were
unconstitutional because statute expressly discriminates against blacks); Bush v. Orleans
Parish Sch. Bd., 365 U.S. 564, 581 (1961) (declaring statute that gave governor power to
close schools if he was forced to desegregate them unconstitutional); Strauder,100 U.S. at
304-05 (declaring statute invalid that kept blacks off juries because of color).
148 See Palmer, 403 U.S. at 220 (recognizing no discriminatory purpose when mayor
closed swimming pools rather than desegregating them). But see Sims, 389 U.S. at 407
(overturning conviction of African-American because police officers physically forced him to
confess); Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 365-67 (ruling application of statute unconstitutional because it discriminated against Chinese ancestry).
149 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971) (subjecting applicants to
aptitude test was not unconstitutional because there was no showing of purposeful discrimination); see also Wards Cove Packaging Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 643 (1989) (stating statistical evidence not enough to prove purposeful discrimination); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972) (rejecting de facto discrimination claim for lack of purposeful
discrimination). But see also City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 55 (1980) (finding no
purposeful discrimination because blacks could register to vote without hindrance).
150 See Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 480 (recognizing that discrimination based on Spanish
surnames was comparable to discrimination based on national language); Yu Cong Eng v.
Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 517-19 (1926) (stating that "proficiency in particular language, like
skin color, should be treated as surrogate for race"); Olagues v. Russiohello, 797 F.2d 1511,
1520 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that investigation of Spanish and Chinese speakers was comparable to targeting Spanish and Chinese immigrants), vacated as moot, 108 S. Ct. 52
(1987); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (showing that law prohibiting
teachers from teaching other languages was unconstitutional).
151 See Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 64 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 1995) (declaring Arizonan's official English legislation unconstitutional on First Amendment
grounds).
152 See O'Connor, supra note 27, at 586 (noting increases in Chinese immigrants as result of declines in China's economy).
153 See O'Connor, supra note 27, at 588 (discussing increase in Latin immigrants); see
also Linda Diebel, NAFTA: Where Did the Jobs Go? Labor Losses in Canadaand U.S. Have
Not Been Offset By Gains in Mexico, THE TORONTO STAR,Sept. 24, 1995, at F7 (discussing
that decrease in hourly wages in Mexico as result of NAFTA has led to greater need for
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States. 5 4 This influx of cultures has lead to a growing anti-immigrant sentiment. 155 In response to changing trends, the majority,
by passing racially biased legislation is, discriminating against
immigrants. 156 It seems that the Arizona amendment is just one
example of legislation that is, on its face, discriminatory.
2.

Examples of De Jure Legislation

In Korematsu v. United States, 5 7 the court upheld "racist" legislation 5 8 passed during WWII.' 5 9 This legislation excluded all persons of Japanese ancestry from designated west coast areas. 60 A
fear of the Japanese led to what Justice Murphy termed "racist
legislation."' 6 1 There are striking similarities between the unfounded threat of non-English languages and the fears which led
immigration to United States for many Mexicans). See generally Greenspan, supra note 18,
at 895 (noting that population in Dade county has increased from 5.3% Hispanic in 1959 to
40% Hispanic in 1980) (citation omitted).
154 See Bill 0. Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism:Addressing the Tension of Separatism and Conflict in an Immigrant Driven Racial Society, 81
CAL. L. REV. 863, 865-66 (1993) (discussing increase in Latino and Asian population). See
generally Greg B. Smith, U.S. Ethnic Diversity Expanding, S.F. ExAMINER, June 12, 1991,
at A16 (discussing increase in Latino and Asian population); William R. Tamayo, When the
'Coloreds" Are Neither Black Nor Citizens: The United States Civil Rights Movement and
Global Migration, 2 ASIAN L.J. 1, 9 (1995) (discussing population and immigration).
155 See Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 933 (stating that Article XVIII was promulgated to prohibit
communication in language other than English).
156 See, e.g., Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36, 40 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding there was
no right to receive Spanish Social Security notices); Guadalupe Org. Inc. v. Tempe Elementary Sch. Dist., 587 F.2d 1022, 1024 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding failure to provide bilingual
education is disallowed and noting there was no right to unemployment notices in Spanish); Carmona v. Sheffield, 475 F.2d 738, 738 (9th Cir. 1973) (concerning dissemination of
unemployment insurance benefits literature only in English).
157 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 214 (1944) (excluding persons of Japanese ancestry, including citizens whose loyalty was not questioned, from West Coast war
area in 1942, was constitutional).
158 See id. at 234 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (stating that regulation was "obvious racial
discrimination").
159 See PERSONAL JUSTICE DEFINED: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS 3 (1982) (following Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor,
U.S. government imposed curfew on Japanese Americans residing in western states, thereafter ordering their detention in internment camps). See generally 41 Fed. Reg. 7741 (1976)
(stating that evacuation was one of our "national mistakes," President Ford formally repealed Executive Order No. 9066 in 1976); 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (1942) (enacting legal authority
to "prevent" and "protect against" espionage or insurgence in the wake of Pearl Harbor).
160 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 242 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (claiming that legislation
was violative of equal protection and was in fact "legalization of racism"); Id. (noting that
"reasons [invoked in support of government's policy] appear ...to be largely an accumulation of much of the misinformation, half-truths and insinuations that for years have been
directed against Japanese Americans by people with racial and economic prejudices-the
same people who have been among the foremost advocates of the evacuation.").
161 See id. at 242 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (noting that legislation was discriminatory).
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to the Korematsu case.' 6 2 "Official English" legislation may very
well be a modern Korematsu, where "racist" legislation is promulgated under the guise of English-only laws.1 6 3
Another modern day example of the consequences of racial hostility is "Proposition 187," a California proposal which limited
public benefits to illegal immigrants.1 6 4 Legislation that is de jure
discrimination has not fared well in the courts. 1 6 5 For example, in
Proposition 187, a preliminary injunction was granted restraining
66 and striking
the government from implementing legislation,
67
down some of its sections as unconstitutional.

162 See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371 (1991) (showing that multilingual or
bilingual speakers are viewed with ridicule and scorn); see also Califa, supra note 19, at
328 (showing that individual fears of Hispanics were driving force for "official English"
legislation); Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration:The Intersection of Immigration Status, Ethnicity, Gender and Class, 42 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1509, 1528-31 (1995) (noting how undocumented persons are not eligible for federal public assistance programs).
163 See Perea, supra note 2, at 278 (noting that during times of strife majority lashes out
at minority and uses them as scapegoat). See, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S.
81, 90 (1943) (holding curfew order against Japanese-Americans was constitutional delegation of power necessary to prevent insurgence in area threatened by Japanese attack).
164 See Barbara Nesbet, California'sProposition 187: A Painful History Repeats Itself, 1
U.C. DAVIs J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 153, 156-60 (1995) (warning that pitfalls of"Save our State"
(Proposition 187) tracked failed Depression-era initiative, "Bracero Program;" which focused on denying state services such as education and health care to those suspected of
being undocumented immigrants).
165 See Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298 (1927) (finding legislation restricting
language use unconstitutional); Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 506 (1926) (finding
Chinese Bookkeeping Act invalid since it was discriminatory); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923) (stating that legislation was arbitrary and discriminatory); Bartels v. Iowa,
262 U.S. 404, 409 (1923) (finding statute limiting language use unconstitutional). See, e.g.,
Gregorio T. v. Wilson, 59 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 1995) (granting preliminary injunction
preventing California from enforcing "Proposition 187").
166 See Gregorio T., 59 F.3d at 1002 (preventing application of Proposition 187); see also
Paul Feldman & Rich Connell, Wilson Acts to Enforce Prop. 187; 8 Lawsuits Filed, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 10, 1994, at Al (citing eight lawsuits filed in state and federal courts to enjoin
enforcement of Proposition 187). See generally Roberto Suro, Two CaliforniaJudges Block
Anti-Immigrant Measure at Start, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 1994, at A39 (noting that support
for Proposition was clearly divided along ethnic lines: approved overwhelmingly by whites,
rejected by Latinos more than three to one, and supported by half of Asian and AfricanAmerican populations).
167 See generally League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755,
771-74, 780-81 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (holding motions granted in part, denied in part; i.e. (a)
California initiative excluding illegal aliens from public social services and from publicly
funded health care were preempted under federal immigration law as impermissible
scheme of immigration regulation; (b) provision excluding illegal aliens from schools was
prohibited by Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment from excluding undocumented alien children from public schools; (c) provision denying public social services to
illegal immigrants conflicted with federal law making those benefits available regardless of
immigration status).
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The fundamental purpose of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is to guarantee individuals the right to
receive notice and the opportunity to be heard. 6 ' It is submitted
that, by preventing non-English speaking citizens from receiving
and understanding
information, English-only laws violate due
9
6

process. 1

The Supreme Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co. 170, declared that poor attempts at notice are not due process, but a mere spectacle of a due process procedure. 171 The
Court's present view, illustrated in Mullane, may be considered a
balancing test, in which the court weighs the costs of requiring a

particular set of procedures against the benefit received from the
use of those procedures. 172 The factors considered in this test include: (i) the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; (ii) the risk of erroneous deprivation of such an interest
168 See Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) (noting that due process includes
right to be heard); see also Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 420-21 (1948)
(stating that aliens have right to due process). But see also Gorman v. University of Rhode
Island, 887 F.2d 7, 7 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that University gave plaintiff his rights when
he was charged with abusive language through hearing and appeal procedure and furthermore, due process does not require trial in adversarial procedure; in this case hearings
were fair and comported with requirements of due process).
169 See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575 (1975) (holding that suspension from public
school, without notice or hearing constituted depravation of constitutionally protected
property interest); Id. at 576 (stating that where students are suspended for disciplinary
reasons for more than trivial period, due process requires that they be given oral or written
notice); Grannis, 234 U.S. at 393 (stating that fundamental requirement of due process is
opportunity to be heard); see also Mullane v. Central Hanover & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
314 (1950) (stating that "right to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed
that matter is pending"). But see also Ingram v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 682 (1977) (proposing that corporal punishment in schools implicates constitutionally protected liberty interest, but procedural due process does not require hearing before beatings can be inflicted).
170 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
171 See id. at 314-315 (stating that person's due process is violated when means employed to convey information are nonsensical); see also Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462
(1941) (stating that fundamental requirement of due process is notice reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of action and give them opportunity to be heard); Grannis, 234 U.S. at 397 (stating that fundamental requisite of due
process is opportunity to be heard and notice); Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398, 409 (1900)
(stating that notice must afford reasonable time for those interested to make appearance);
Alfonso v. Board of Review, Dep't of Labor and Indus., 444 A.2d 1075 (N.J. 1982) (Wilentz,
C.J., dissenting) (stating that, following Mullane, plaintiff was not given notice of right to
appeal). See generally Pabon v. Levine, 70 F.R.D. 674, 677 (1976) (holding that New York
State Department of Labor unlawfully deprived plaintiffs of unemployment insurance benefits because all materials pertaining to person's right to assert claim for such benefits were
printed in English).
172 See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 306 (establishing balancing test to be used in determining
violation of Due Process Clause).
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through procedures used and (iii) the burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would produce.1 7 3
Under this balancing test, the constitutionality of official English legislation would be examined by weighing the burden on the
government in providing notice to non-English speaking individuals against the benefit to individuals in receiving information in
their native language. 1 7 4 Proponents of the Arizona legislation
claim that not having English as the official language would impose a major burden on the government because it would require
the government to be continually vigilant in ascertaining whether
proper notice is given to every individual. 175 The supporters assert
that it would be extremely expensive to properly monitor due process guarantees. Thus, the burden to the government would far
outweigh the benefit to the individual. 7 6 In addition, proponents
assert that it is very expensive to maintain documents in languages other than English. 7 7 This argument is dubious under the
Mullane test because much of the information is already translated by the government and it would cost little to continue such
173 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (utilizing balancing test, finding
that due process was not violated when person's social security disability benefits were
terminated before receiving evidentiary hearing); see also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134,
167-68 (1974) (stating that analysis of governmental and private interest is required to
determine constitutionality of due process); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)
(noting that "due process is flexible," depending on particular situation); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970) (stating that intent of procedural due process depends on
whether recipient's interest outweighs governmental interest in summary adjudications).
174 See 20 U.S.C. § 3223 (a) (2) (1997) (defining native language as "language normally
used by such individuals, or in the case of a child, the language normally used by the parents of the child"); see also Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 567 (1974) (holding that placing
non-English speaking students in classroom without special assistance violated Civil
Rights Act of Title VI); Id. (deciding issue of right of minority children to receive equal
education). See generally Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317-18 (analyzing governmental interests
and benefits to individuals).
175 See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970) (stating that state should not be
second-guessed on discussions of allocating limited public welfare funds); Carmona v. Sheffield, 475 F.2d 738, 739 (9th Cir. 1973) (claiming that states argue that providing interpreters and sending Spanish language notices would impose undue burden).
176 See Frontera v. Sindell, 522 F.2d 1215, 1219 (6th Cir. 1975) (claiming that city which
already has severe financial problems would get "saddled" with expenses such as hiring
translators); Carmona, 475 F.2d at 739 (stating that government would be severely burdened if English language requirement is not imposed). But see Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,
76-77 (1971) (stating that reducing workload of probate courts by mandatory preference
based on sex is arbitrary).
177 See Tamayo, supra note 154, at 7 (stating that immigrants are burdensome to United
States); see also O'Connor, supra note 27, at 592, 598 (stating that Florida wanted reimbursement for $1.5 billion state expected to spend on providing social services for illegal
immigrants) (citing Neil R. Pierce, The Ugly-But Inevitable Debate, NAT'L L.J., July 16,
1994, at 1700). See generally Frontera,522 F.2d at 1219 (discussing how translations are
impractical); Carmona, 475 F.2d at 739 (noting burden of translating literature).

322

ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 12:295

In addition courts would assess the public interest as
activity.'
to whom
great because of the value to the millions of 1individuals
79
information will be effectively disseminated.
CONCLUSION

The promulgation of monolinguistic legislation will lead to separatism. Allowing official English legislation is governmental promotion of discrimination. Official English legislation is stigmatizing and discriminatory. This legislation is unconstitutional
under the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and Title VII. These laws create feelings of inferiority and inequality
and are nothing but a symbol of misdirected anger at differences
in cultures and people.
Carmen B. Tigreros

178 See Guerrero v. Carleson, 512 P.2d 833, 835 (Cal. 1973) (Tobriner, J., dissenting)
(stating that if some forms are now printed in Spanish, it cannot be unduly burdensome to
print form of revocation or reduction in Spanish).
179 See Alfonso v. Board of Review, Dep't of Labor & Indus., 444 A.2d 1075, 1079 (N.J.
1982) (Wilentz, C.J., dissenting) (proposing that when using balancing test in Mullane,
future benefits should be included in formula). See, e.g., Yniguez v. Arizonans For Official
English, 69 F. 3d 920, 941 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that downside to official-English will
"preclude a legislative committee from convening on reservation and questioning a tribal
leader in his native language concerning the problems of his community").

